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Latin America has long been cursed with sudden economic 
downturns, credit crises, and sociopolitical instability.1 Most re-
cently, the 1997 Asian financial crisis and the 1998 Russian Ruble 
crisis triggered a drought of capital inflows to the region from 1998 
to 2002, leading to debt crises, inflation, and slow or negative eco-
nomic growth.2  !ese years of crisis were in line with much of Lat-
in America’s economic history: overdependence on foreign financ-
ing and low levels of savings during economic upturns continually 
led to harsh credit crunches and contractions during downturns.3
Beginning in the fourth quarter of 2002, however, an excep-
tional combination of abundant financing, soaring commodity 
prices across the agricultural, mineral, and hydrocarbon sectors, 
and significant remittance flows produced an exuberant economic 
boom.4  Many nations also moved toward greater exchange rate 
flexibility, inflation-targeting policies, stronger central banks, mod-
erate debt-to-GDP ratios, and credible monetary regimes.5  Taken 
together, these macroeconomic reforms and positive economic con-
ditions led observers to a common conclusion: should a crisis arise, 
Latin America would enjoy newfound fiscal and monetary “space” 
in which to enact activist countercyclical policies.6
Such a crisis was not far o". With the 2008 collapse of the 
global financial system, Latin America saw a dramatic reversal in 
every driver of the boom. Remittance flows stagnated, internation-
al trade contracted drastically, commodity prices plummeted, and 
capital inflows to the region ground to a halt.7 Time was up. !e 
boom had ended.
!is paper focuses on a key question: has Latin America 
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earned, in the words of José Juan Ruiz, “the privilege of normal-
ity?”8  Did Latin American countries develop the macroeconomic 
capacity necessary to escape the large-scale currency depreciations, 
major financial disruptions, and pro-cyclical “sudden stops” in fi-
nancing during downturns that mar the region’s history? And if so, 
what circumstances contribute to or detract from states’ abilities to 
implement these countercyclical programs in the face of a crisis? 
!rough a controlled comparison of several Latin American 
countries, I demonstrate the pathway Latin American countries 
have taken to accumulate or deplete the fiscal space needed for 
countercyclical policy. By examining the macroeconomic behavior 
of these countries prior to and following the 2008 financial crisis, I 
determine that e"ective management of international reserves and 
fiscal sustainability are crucial conditions for any country looking 
to mediate the severity of an economic downturn.  Some, but not 
all, Latin American countries developed these crucial macroeco-
nomic capacities.  Many enacted these policies on tenuous political 
grounds. Perhaps the most important question is whether those 
who have earned normality will continue the policies they need to 
keep it. 
THE POLITICS OF RAINY DAY FUNDS
By September 2009, the economic crisis had turned global. 
Both academic and international financial communities had largely 
embraced the Keynesian theory that fiscal and monetary policy can 
play an important stabilization role in an economy by stimulating 
aggregate demand. By engaging in fiscal and monetary activism, 
governments can mitigate the impact of a global crisis, sustain the 
purchasing power of the middle class, avert social backlash and pre-
vent further economic loss.9 Y.V. Reddy, for instance, writes that 
countercyclical policy can be crucial for developing countries, inso-
far as unchecked crises in emerging markets can lead to dramatic 
sociopolitical instability.10
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In Latin America, the combination of democratization and 
frequent economic crises has led to governing coalitions that are 
mindful of economic performance. If a governing party fails to de-
liver on economic promises—or if the leader presides over a sharp 
economic downturn—this leader and party can expect to be voted 
out of o#ce in the next national election.11 At the onset of the 
crisis in 2008, political leaders in Latin America shared the general 
incentive, on both symbolic and material grounds, to implement 
countercyclical fiscal policies. On one hand, politicians would want 
to demonstrate to voters that they took decisive and immediate ac-
tion in response to the crisis. On the other hand, by attempting 
to stimulate aggregate demand, they would ideally prevent a large-
scale downturn that would harm their future political prospects.
While all governments in Latin America shared incentives to 
implement countercyclical policy, each government di"ered greatly 
in its capacity to do so. During the run-up to the crisis, each gov-
ernment made choices that contributed to or restricted its ability 
to respond with stimulus programs. !is paper focuses on these 
variations in the ability to implement countercyclical fiscal policy, 
contending that the size and extent of fiscal stimulus programs in 
response to the 2008 crisis will be modulated by each government’s 
actions during the 2003–2007 boom period.
Governments can finance countercyclical stimulus packages 
if they have savings or through loans. But as the region learned in 
the late 1990s, foreign capital flows are highly unreliable during 
economic downturns. !e conditional loaning practiced by the In-
ternational Monetary Fund (IMF) in the 1990s led to suspicion 
and general hesitation toward accepting financial support from that 
body. !e challenge in the region therefore became, as Cardim de 
Carvalho (2010) writes, “To find ways to deal with the possibility 
of capital flows reversals other than appealing to the IMF for sup-
port.”12
What options did countries have? Latin American govern-
ments between 2003 and 2007 had an opportunity to take advan-
tage of the export boom, either by increasing fiscal revenue streams 
through taxation or by profiting directly from state-owned com-
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panies.13 If governments could also reduce discretionary expen-
ditures—saving for a rainy day—then they could lower sovereign 
debt and run healthy fiscal balances that could fund stimulus pro-
grams or attract lower-interest loans in a crisis.
Governments could also prepare for capital reversals by ac-
cumulating international reserves.14 !rough foreign liquidity 
inflows generated by commodity exports, countries in the region 
could have accumulated foreign exchange reserves throughout the 
boom. !ese reserves could then be used as an “alternate financ-
ing modality” to run temporary fiscal deficits.15 !is latter use is 
of particular relevance to Latin America, a region that witnessed 
extensive accumulation of international reserves into rainy day 
funds or sovereign stabilization funds designed to account for fluc-
tuations in capital inflows or commodity prices.16 During crises, 
international reserves’ opportunity costs rise at the same time that 
their returns fall, which incentivizes an appropriately countercycli-
cal use of the funds.17
Two critical distinctions must be made regarding the accu-
mulation of reserves. First, Cardim de Carvalho and Gri#th-Jones 
and Ocampo (2008) argue that the current account balance should 
play a central role in considering the use value of international re-
serves.18 When reserve accumulation is driven by a current account 
surplus, these reserves represent a net accumulation of wealth in 
foreign exchange assets; these reserves are “owned” and ready to be 
put into immediate use. During a current account deficit, on the 
other hand, the reserves merely reflect an increase in foreign loans, 
and as such these reserves are merely “borrowed” liabilities.19 In 
order for reserves to be used as stabilization funds, they must be 
accumulated with a current account surplus. 
Second, the use value of international reserves is further con-
ditioned by fiscal sustainability. Although these rainy day funds 
can be measured objectively, to the governments that control them 
they have a relative value, one that can only be understood with 
respect to the perceived risks and benefits derived from their use. 
At the onset of a crisis, countries have an incentive to tap into these 
funds to stimulate aggregate demand and fight for electoral favor. 
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!ese outcomes represent a potential benefit for using the reserves 
at the moment of the crisis. But governments are also constrained 
by concerns with debt sustainability. If a government runs a fiscal 
deficit with high sovereign debt, its leaders risk depleting reserves 
today and leaving themselves highly vulnerable to worse crises in 
the future. But while holding onto the reserves may come with risk, 
these reserve pools would remain available for future dramatic sud-
den stops. In layman’s terms, countries might not spend their rainy 
day funds today if they fear a torrential downpour tomorrow. As 
Alberola and Montero argue, past experiences with financial melt-
downs and capital flight have made many Latin American coun-
tries particularly “debt intolerant”; governments concerned with 
their creditworthiness will have much greater incentives to hold 
on to their reserves as a last resort.20 I therefore expect that these 
owned international reserves will be used to finance fiscal deficits 
only insofar as the risk of using them is perceived to be lower than 
the risk of holding them. 
Of course, governments in the region may not have saved dur-
ing the boom period. It is well known that sociopolitical pressures 
during times of plenty can create political economy distortions 
that prompt pro-cyclical spending.21 Gri#th-Jones and Ocampo 
(2008) note that countries often neglect the ephemeral nature of 
commodity price booms and spend beyond their means. To varying 
extents and for multiple reasons, every country in the region en-
gaged in at least some level of pro-cyclical public spending during 
the boom period.22  
Of the many explanations of fiscal pro-cyclicality, the most 
relevant for this time period is the  “voracity” e"ect, wherein a tem-
porary increase in fiscal revenues leads to disproportionately higher 
amounts of government spending, tax cuts, and subsidies.23 !e 
ability of a government to resist these political economy pressures 
during upturns depends on a wide variety of variables, including the 
composition of coalitions and political competition. A government 
that assents to expansionary political distortions during a boom 
may find that it has emptied the fiscal co"ers when a crisis hits, 
rendering it largely incapable of responding with countercyclical 
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policy, however much it wants to protect its vulnerable citizens.24 
Taken together, these coalitional e"ects and political pressures alter 
each government’s incentive to either spend or save during upturns, 
which in turn a"ects their capacities at the onset of the crisis.
I predict that the size and extent of fiscal stimulus policies 
will be determined by the combination of two variables: owned in-
ternational reserves and fiscal sustainability.25 Larger stockpiles of 
international reserves and favorable fiscal sustainability will result 
in larger stimulus programs, as governments tap into their reserve 
funds with confidence. A country with reserves but with doubts 
about sustainability may produce some stimulus programs, but 
these are likely to be limited in size by concerns of creditworthi-
ness. Finally, countries with smaller pools of international reserves 
and greater concerns with debt sustainability are expected to enact 
little to no fiscal stimulus programs, despite the broad political in-
centives to do so. !ese two variables, of course, are two sides of the 
same coin: improvements in the fiscal balance and the accumula-
tion of rainy day funds both speak broadly to solid macroeconomic 
management and to the fact that countries have saved prudently 
during the boom.
In selecting countries for this study, I have chosen the sev-
en largest Latin American economies, or the LAC-7: Argentina, 
Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Mexico, Peru, and Venezuela. Together, 
these countries account for over 90 percent of Latin America’s 
total GDP.26 In selecting the LAC-7, I establish a relatively con-
trolled group of cases from which reasonable conclusions may be 
drawn. By focusing on Latin America, I hope to concentrate on a 
region with similar historical experiences and comparable political-
economic institutions. Nevertheless, it should be said that further 
research in other emerging market regions—many of which expe-
rienced similar macroeconomic and sociopolitical phenomena over 
the same time period—could contribute to a greater understand-
ing of fiscal space and policy.
133Journal of Politics & Society
ESTIMATING FISCAL SUSTAINABILITY
Fiscal sustainability is not a straightforward concept, but 
rather a multidimensional consideration of a country’s budget con-
ditions, its future prospects, and the international market for that 
country’s debt.27 Rather than rely on one measure alone, I have col-
lected a series of data that capture various components of a coun-
try’s prospects for sustainability and creditworthiness.
First, the measure most commonly used to account for in-
ternational capital markets’ view of emerging market sustainabil-
ity is J.P. Morgan’s Emerging Markets Bond Index (EMBI). !ese 
EMBI spreads serve as a “market-based indicator of available fiscal 
space” as defined by the “perceived default risk on external debt.”28 
Second, I have included public debt as a percentage of GDP. De-
veloping countries with unsustainably large debt burdens may find 
it particularly di#cult to obtain renewed external financing, at least 
at manageably low interest rates.29 !ird, a government’s fiscal bal-
ance provides another look at sustainability, given that high fiscal 
deficits are considered unsustainable while improvements in the 
fiscal balance are considered indicative of strong macroeconomic 
management. Fourth, Fernández-Arias and Montiel (2009) con-
tribute another helpful measure of fiscal sustainability in the LAC-
7 as of 2007. !ey calculate a “required structural adjustment” given 
as the percentage of GDP that would be necessary for each country 
to maintain its debt-to-GDP ratio at that time.30 By adjusting for 
terms of trade, it makes a projection about what countries can ex-
pect when these factors worsen in a crisis. !e higher the estimated 
required structural adjustment, the more likely it is that the coun-
try will face concerns about skepticism from foreign credit markets. 
Finally, I perform a calculation of total public expenditures over 
public revenues in each country. !is is a rough measurement of 
how much each government has saved or spent during the boom 
years; values over one hundred show greater expenditure than rev-
enues, whereas values below one hundred show more saving.31 
!e 2007 measures are displayed in Table 1 (online), which 
gives a broad overview of each country’s long-term fiscal sustain-
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ability immediately prior to the crisis.32
Unsurprisingly, Chile stands out for its high degree of fiscal 
sustainability in every measure. Many close observers of fiscal policy 
in the region during the boom years noted that Chile demonstrated 
the most countercyclical fiscal restraint of any country.33 !anks to 
Chile’s good reputation in international financial markets, it likely 
had few concerns about creditworthiness when the crisis struck. 
Peru’s adoption of a Fiscal Responsibility and Transparency Law 
at the turn of the century earns it a close second place.34 !e clear 
advantage of Peru and Chile in all measures supports Ocampo’s 
assessment in late 2007 that only Peru and Chile had sustained 
countercyclical restraint during the boom.35
Conversely, there is the Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela, 
which has been legendary for its pro-cyclical spending.36 !is 
notoriety is well reflected in its high EMBI spreads. Interestingly 
enough, Venezuela’s gross public debt and overall balance might 
suggest a somewhat secure fiscal position. But in this case these fig-
ures are misleading: over 80 percent of Venezuela’s total exports are 
crude oil and other oil products, and while exports led to an average 
GDP growth rate of over 11 percent between 2004 and 2007, there 
was no accompanying improvement in fiscal management during 
that time. 37 As Venezuela’s pro-cyclical rate of government ex-
penditure and enormous required structural adjustment indicate, 
President Chávez’s government greatly spent beyond its means, 
particularly in 2006–2007.38 Venezuela will likely have the great-
est concerns with debt sustainability.
Argentina is another country with serious doubts about 
creditworthiness and access to foreign financing. Like Venezuela, 
Argentina since its 2001 default has been regarded with suspicion 
in EMBI risk spreads. Most troubling, it has the highest debt-to-
GDP ratio of the LAC-7. And while Argentina’s overall balance 
and expenditure over revenue figures are a bit less worrisome, both 
of these measures went in a troubling direction between 2006 and 
2007, reflecting what Ocampo warned was a “recent upward trend 
in public spending” in Argentina.39 As Bill Faries noted in late 
2007, much of the increased public spending was financed by the 
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commodity price boom and was driven in anticipation of the 2007 
elections. !is trend calls the country’s fiscal sustainability further 
into doubt.40
Mexico is a complex case. Its 2007 EMBI spreads and debt-
to-GDP ratios would suggest that its leaders could have a"orded 
to be optimistic. Its modest overall balance and government ex-
penditures indicate that while the government has not made great 
strides, neither has it incapacitated itself with spending. Yet its 
required structural adjustment is the second most severe. Why 
would this be the case? !is is attributable to Mexico’s economic 
integration with the United States, and its resulting greatest single 
market overdependence among the LAC-7; it sent 82 percent of 
its total exports to the US in 2007.41 At the onset of the crisis, 
the Mexican economy could likely expect a much more severe con-
traction (and subsequently a drop in government revenues and an 
increase in sovereign debt) than the more diversified countries of 
South America. !erefore, while some of the 2007 figures indicate 
room for optimism, in practice, the Mexican government may have 
had more reason to worry that low-risk foreign financing would be 
available as the downturn continued.
!is leaves Colombia and Brazil remarkably close in each 
measurement. Colombia enjoys some negligible advantages in sev-
eral categories, but Brazil’s strength as an emerging power could 
make up for these small di"erences in securing external financing. 
Moreover, both countries had enacted fiscal responsibility laws 
meant to increase investor confidence.42 In short, to Brazil and 
Columbia fiscal sustainability may not be of immediate concern, 
but policymakers in both countries should be mindful of these con-
straints as they enact fiscal policy.
It is now possible to group the LAC-7 into three categories of 
sustainability. Peru and Chile should have been unconcerned with 
their creditworthiness at the onset of the crisis. Mexico, Brazil and 
Colombia all enjoy a mix of encouraging and limiting factors, and 
therefore their governments should have displayed some reason-
able concerns with sustainability. Lastly, the Chávez and Kirchner 
governments of Venezuela and Argentina, respectively, likely felt 
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highly constrained by creditworthiness at the onset of the crisis. By 
giving in to pro-cyclical spending toward the end of the economic 
boom, both governments handicapped themselves when it comes 
to enacting policy at the onset of a crisis.
!e next section will evaluate the other component of my hy-
pothesis: each country’s holdings of international reserves.
INTERNATIONAL RESERVES AND THE CURRENT 
ACCOUNT
International reserves increased in every LAC-7 country be-
tween 2003 and 2007.43 !ese across-the-board increases, with 
Brazil showing particularly spectacular leaps after 2005, were her-
alded as positive steps for the countries in the region. But for the 
purposes of this paper, it is crucial to distinguish between inter-
national reserve accumulations under current account surpluses or 
deficits.44
Estimating the e"ect of the current account on international 
reserve accumulation to di"erentiate between owned and borrowed 
reserves presents methodological challenges. !is paper proposes a 
simple, if crude, estimation by using the strength of the current 
account surplus as a multiplier e"ect on reserves. For each country 
and year, I have multiplied the international reserves in dollars by 
the size of the current account balance as a percentage of GDP. !is 
index attempts to estimate an adjusted size of international reserve 
holdings as moderated by the current account balance; the higher 
the current account surplus, the more likely that these reserve ac-
cumulations will reflect owned reserves rather than just increased 
foreign liabilities. Conversely, low current account surpluses or cur-
rent account deficits would imply that international reserves merely 
reflect increased foreign liabilities that would exacerbate, rather 
than help, a developing country’s financing situation during a sud-
den stop.45 I have included this index in Table 2 (online). Larger 
values imply a combination of significant reserve pools and a strong 
current account surplus.
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A closer examination of the numbers for each country may 
reveal the utility of the index. I will start with the countries with 
the two highest indices: Argentina and Venezuela. !ese countries 
enjoyed only the third- and fourth-largest pools of international re-
serves in 2007. Between 2003 and 2007, Argentina’s international 
reserves increased by a factor of 3.4, and Argentina ran a steady 
current account surplus over that period. Venezuela’s international 
reserves pool increased by a factor of 1.7, but its current account 
surplus averaged 13.6 percent of GDP. Of course, it must be noted 
that Venezuela’s 8.8 percent drop in international reserves between 
2006 and 2007 is indicative of a pro-cyclical utilization of these 
funds. !is depletion in the reserves pool is the only factor calling 
the Venezuelan government’s access to reserves into question. Yet 
Argentina and Venezuela had both unquestionably accumulated a 
substantial amount of these owned international reserves. 
Conversely, while Brazil had by far the largest pool of inter-
national reserves in the region, this figure is much less impressive 
when adjusted for the size of Brazil’s economy and considering 
Brazil’s explosive capital account surplus toward the latter half 
of the boom years.47 !ese flows of borrowed assets into Brazil 
explain the country’s leap in international reserves between 2006 
and 2007. So while Brazil’s international reserve statistics appear 
impressive, there is great reason to believe that these funds would 
not have been readily available to finance countercyclical stimulus 
programs, and this lower availability is reflected in Brazil’s lower 
index score for 2007.
Chile’s accumulation of international reserves, on the other 
hand, looks moderate at best in dollar amounts; reserves only in-
creased by a factor of 1.06 over the boom. Does this mean that 
Chile did not accumulate enough reserves to finance countercyclical 
policy? Two factors suggest otherwise. First, much like Argentina, 
Chile ran a steady current account surplus after 2003, suggesting 
that its international reserves holdings reflect owned, rather than 
borrowed assets. More importantly, the Chilean government had 
created two sovereign stabilization funds, together worth about 
$21.9 billion (over 15 percent of GDP), designed to protect against 
138 +IX^0EXMR%QIVMGER'SYRXIVG]GPMGEP*MWGEP7TEGI
currency shocks and to fund fiscal deficits during crises.48 All fac-
tors considered, Chile’s access to reserves to fund countercyclical 
policy  is second to Argentina.
Peru is another country for which international reserve levels 
are more promising considering the current account and govern-
ment prudence. Peru’s current account surpluses after 2003 sug-
gest that reserves accumulation was set in motion by increases in 
commodity exports. And, like Chile, the Peruvian government in 
2003 created a Fiscal Stabilization Fund comprising international 
reserves from capital inflows on exports.49 !is fund provided for 
steady reserve accumulation in Peru even in 2007, when its current 
account surplus decreased slightly. Peru therefore falls behind Ar-
gentina and Chile with respect to available international reserves.
Last, Colombia and Mexico are remarkably similar in terms 
of international reserves. !roughout the boom, both accumulated 
international reserves under a steady current account deficit (capi-
tal account surplus).50 But both countries had also established 
sovereign stabilization funds to accumulate reserves from their oil 
exports. And while these sovereign funds were less substantial than 
those of Chile and Peru, they could nevertheless account for some 
fiscal flexibility at the onset of the crisis.51 In general, both Colom-
bia and Mexico accumulated a fair amount of international reserves 
in sovereign funds, but under conditions that call into question 
their abilities to fund fiscal deficits during a sudden stop.52
I group the countries into four categories based on the size 
and owned nature of their international reserves. Argentina, by vir-
tue of its large-scale accumulations and the surplus in its current 
account, and Chile, from its comparable gains and sovereign stabi-
lization funds, lead the pack. Peru saw less reserve accumulations 
and a relatively smaller current account surplus, but its sovereign 
stabilization fund contributes to its capacity to use international 
reserves for fiscal stimulus. I place it in the second-highest category. 
Venezuela joins Peru in this second category; its reserve accumula-
tions under a large current account surplus are slightly counterbal-
anced by considerable depletion of the stockpile during 2006 and 
2007. Next, in the third category, are Colombia and Mexico. While 
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their reserve accumulation was modest and took place during capi-
tal account surpluses, the fact that both countries have sovereign 
stabilization funds with predetermined criteria for use during 
economic downturns indicates that the governments have at least 
some immediately deployable reserves. 
I place Brazil alone in the last category for two reasons. First, 
while Brazil’s reserves pool is the largest in the LAC-7, this increase 
came only during an intense period of foreign capital loans at the 
end of 2006; these numbers are inflated by the sheer size of Brazil’s 
economy and do not reflect truly owned reserves. Second, unlike 
Colombia and Mexico, the Brazilian government at the time of the 
crisis had not established sovereign stabilization funds in prepara-
tion for an economic downturn. I therefore judge Brazil to have the 
least immediate access to international reserves for deficit financ-
ing.
TWO-DIMENSIONAL EXPRESSION OF FISCAL SPACE
Large levels of international reserves will result in large fiscal 
stimulus programs, but only insofar as concerns with long-term fis-
cal sustainability do not limit governments’ willingness to tap into 
these rainy day funds.53 My hypothesis predicts that, as a country 
accumulates more owned foreign reserves and improves its fiscal 
sustainability, the size and extent of its countercyclical fiscal stimu-
lus programs enacted in reaction to the 2008 crisis will increase. 
Based on the information I have gathered, then, I therefore predict 
that Chile will enact the largest fiscal stimulus program in the area, 
with Peru enacting the second largest. 
Drawing out predictions for the remaining five countries is 
a bit more complex, insofar as doing so requires making assump-
tions about which requires making more restrictive assumption: a 
lower availability of international reserves or concerns about debt 
sustainability. As previously mentioned, I conceive international re-
serves according to their relative value. Concerns with debt sustain-
ability will condition a given government’s evaluation of the costs 
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and risks of using the rainy day funds in response to a crisis. While 
international reserves may be the financing source for countercy-
clical spending programs, debt sustainability is the condition that 
allows or restrains the use of those funds.
Consider Argentina, whose pool of international reserves is 
quite large. It is crucial to remember Argentina’s traumatic experi-
ence with financial crises, its aversion to the IMF, and the multiple 
reasons to question its creditworthiness with respect to the future. 
!is aversion to debt fundamentally alters the use value of these re-
serve pools by increasing the perceived risk in using these funds to-
day rather than saving them for the future. !e same holds true for 
Venezuela. Despite high levels of international reserves, I expect 
debt sustainability concerns to incentivize saving the funds rather 
than using them. Argentina and Venezuela, therefore, are expected 
to have the smallest degrees of countercyclical fiscal responses to 
the crisis.
While Brazil, Colombia, and Mexico each should have 
roughly similar expectations of debt sustainability, the latter two 
countries had established sovereign stabilization funds by the time 
of the crisis, whereas Brazil had not. !ese stabilization funds 
o"er pre-established procedures for implementing countercycli-
cal spending and could be expected to have a significant e"ect. I 
therefore expect Colombia and Mexico to have larger levels of fiscal 
stimulus than Brazil. 
To review, my hypothesis predicts that the LAC-7 fiscal 
stimulus programs in response to the 2008 crisis should fall, from 
largest to smallest, as follows: Chile, Peru, Colombia and Mexico, 
Brazil, Argentina, and Venezuela.
RAINY DAYS AT HAND: FISCAL STIMULUS PROGRAMS IN 
THE REGION
Estimations of the size of stimulus packages throughout Lat-
in America tend to vary widely.54 For each country, I have used the 
most commonly accepted figures. Moreover, I attempt to measure 
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only programs enacted through 2009, thereby isolating the initial 
fiscal responses to the crisis without having the results altered by 
changing economic performance or a return of financing to the 
area.
In Figure 2, below, I present an overview of both the size and 
composition of countercyclical fiscal policies enacted through 2009 
in the LAC-7. For the most part, these programs combined gov-
ernment spending or investment programs with tax cuts. Figure 2 
shows that the order of the LAC-7’s countercyclical fiscal programs 
from largest to smallest would be: Chile, Peru, Colombia, Argen-
tina, Mexico, Brazil, and Venezuela. 
Figure 2
Country % GDP Details of fiscal policies
Chile57 2.3%
Features income tax cuts; subsidy increas-
es for low-income families; large-scale 
public investment in public works, infra-
structure, and housing
Peru58 2.0%
Infrastructure investment projects and 
broad increases in public spending; stimu-
lus support to workers and SMEs; social 
infrastructure spending
Colombia59 1.4%
Tax cuts on income tax, wealth tax, and 
stamp duty; infrastructure spending in 
public works (roads, housing and irriga-
tion projects)
Argentina60 1.3%
Large-scale public works investment plan 
focusing on roads, hospitals, and housing 
projects; tax and pension fund morato-
rium on certain liabilities; tax reductions 
for the middle class
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Mexico61 1.2%
Modest tax cuts and increases in public 
spending allocations; public infrastruc-
ture investment; government support 
programs for SMEs; other public spend-
ing cuts made elsewhere; targeted tax in-
creases
Brazil62 0.55%
Focus on tax cuts (for financial opera-
tions, processed products, for the middle 
class, etc.); investment projects that will 
rely on private sector have been delayed; 
public spending cuts in later 2009
Venezuela – –
Generally no countercyclical stimulus of 
which to speak. Instead, tax increases (es-
pecially to VAT); broad public spending 
cuts in the government budget; wage ceil-
ings for senior civil servants
In Venezuela, Chávez’s government, notwithstanding the 
steady populist rhetoric, was compelled to resort to blatantly pro-
cyclical policies in response to the crisis. !is did not surprise many 
observers, who for years had called attention to the fundamental 
macroeconomic issues of Chávez’s regime.61 !e severity of the 
concerns with long-term debt sustainability in light of Venezuela’s 
poor creditworthiness, together with these macroeconomic prob-
lems, made countercyclical policy untenable. Venezuela anecdot-
ally demonstrates that spending during upturns, even in the case of 
current account surpluses, will limit a government’s ability to enact 
countercyclical fiscal policy during downturns. 
At first glance, the fact that Argentina’s stimulus programs 
amounted to 1.3 percent of GDP—the fourth largest in the LAC-
7—seems to refute my hypothesis. But there is a missing piece of 
crucial information here: Argentina was indeed hesitant to tap 
into its “rainy day” funds. Its international reserve holdings actually 
slightly increased from 2007 to the end of 2009.  Instead, to finance 
its stimulus programs, the Argentine government instituted a mas-
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sive forced nationalization of private pension savings, the flow of 
which accounted for up to 1.5% of GDP.62 !e implications of this 
policy move are twofold. First, the example of Argentina lends cre-
dence to the logic of my thesis insofar as creditworthiness concerns 
limited the government’s willingness to tap freely into rainy day 
funds, deemed a risky solution. Second, and perhaps more impor-
tantly, the example of Argentina calls to the forefront an important 
point about political economy and causality. !is paper attempts 
to relate macroeconomic characteristics with an ideal policy choice. 
Nevertheless, sovereign governments acting under constraint may 
choose from an infinitely larger set of heterodox policy options. 
!is is a healthy limitation on assumptions of causality: interna-
tional reserves may provide a vehicle for countercyclical policy, and 
fiscal sustainability may be an enabling condition, but the ultimate 
policy will depend on a complex decision-making process with a 
broader variety of possible outcomes than simple models suggest.
!e small size of Brazil’s fiscal stimulus packages may have 
stumped those who argued that international reserves were the 
determining factor of Latin America’s macroeconomic progress. 
However, both the type of reserves and a country’s concerns with 
sustainability can greatly alter the utility of reserves with regard to 
countercyclical policy. Moreover, a close comparison with Colom-
bia and Mexico—which were similarly positioned to Brazil with 
respect to sustainability—can elucidate some interesting conclu-
sions about reserve accumulation. Colombia, Mexico, and Brazil all 
accumulated their reserves under low-to-negative current account 
balances, but while Colombia and Mexico saved in established sov-
ereign stabilization funds, Brazil lacked a similar program. !is 
suggests that, all else being equal, sovereign wealth funds with sta-
bilization as an institutionalized motivation, with automatic pro-
cedures resistant to political pressures, may enable policy action 
where the mere accumulation of general reserves does not.  Begin-
ning in 2009, the Brazilian government began accumulating sur-
plus government revenue in the Sovereign Fund of Brazil (FSB), a 
multi-billion dollar fund designed explicitly for stabilization dur-
ing future financial crises, implying that Brazil may have learned a 
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lesson from its energy-exporting neighbors.63 
Colombia and Mexico, as predicted by my hypothesis, both 
enacted countercyclical fiscal programs that were moderate in size. 
Likewise, in Chile and Peru, sovereign stabilization funds of inter-
national reserves were utilized to finance broad spending increases 
and tax cuts,64 and as predicted, Chile’s programs were slightly 
larger than those of Peru.65 !anks to both countries’ fiscal sur-
pluses and manageable debt-to-GDP ratios, policymakers were 
able to tap into these rainy day funds without fearing dispropor-
tionately worse credit crunches in the future. 
Considered altogether, the region’s fiscal policy responses to 
the crisis o"er some preliminary support to my hypothesis that 
while the accumulation of international reserves is an important 
element of preparing for economic shocks, the utility of these re-
serves is conditioned by their composition and by the country’s 
fiscal sustainability. Furthermore, sovereign wealth funds specifi-
cally designed for stabilization purposes during sudden stops and 
commodity price drops played a crucial role in the largest stimulus 
policies in the region. Of course, in several cases, the two variables 
go hand in hand; Peru and Chile created stabilization funds at the 
same time that they improved fiscal balances and lowered sover-
eign debt. !e examples of Mexico and Colombia relative to Bra-
zil, though, suggest that these funds may be related to the size of 
stimulus programs when fiscal sustainability is held more or less 
constant. Finally, as previously mentioned, macroeconomic vari-
ables may act as constraints on government policy, even if these 
constraints may be loose. Argentina’s substantial fiscal stimulus 
program would not have been possible under the model described 
by my thesis, but the government’s nationalization of pension funds 
provided increased revenue with which to finance further deficits. 
From a general standpoint, while enthusiasm for Latin 
America’s improved macroeconomics was not entirely unfounded, 
it often neglected critical di"erences within the region. Contrary 
to the common assertion, a nation’s current account balance im-
provements may or may not have been significant, depending on 
a given government’s ability to increase trade-related revenues and 
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control its expenditures. International reserves accumulation was 
an important step, but how these reserves were accumulated seems 
more salient. Despite the region’s strides toward autonomy, certain 
countries remained highly constrained by poor creditworthiness 
and limited access to financing. Finally, while it is important not to 
confuse favorable external factors for improvements in fiscal man-
agement, it does appear to be the case that the steady accumulation 
of reserves and modest fiscal balance improvements can allow de-
veloping nations to better weather downturns.66
CONCLUSIONS
In striving for descriptive richness, this paper has limited it-
self to the largest countries in a particular region. But the 2008 
global financial crisis struck the developing world all at once, im-
plying that there is a great opportunity for studies with broader 
sample sizes, more complex datasets, and multivariate analysis. 
While I am confident in the instrumental value of my measures, 
there is certainly room for improvement. In particular, future stud-
ies could arrive at more detailed analysis of owned compared to 
borrowed reserves. Nevertheless, as studies become broader, they 
should be accompanied by the type of close examination performed 
here to account for institutional or political phenomena outside the 
parameters of the model. 
My findings suggest that some Latin American countries may 
have indeed earned the privilege of normality, in that they found 
themselves better positioned to handle the 2008 financial crisis. By 
limiting the procyclical political impulse to spend during booms 
and by saving for rainy days, Latin America has thus far generally 
avoided the type of large-scale economic collapse that tarnishes its 
history.67 Indeed, after a precipitous drop in 2009, growth rates 
for the LAC-7 countries (excluding Venezuela) rose to an aver-
age of 6.7 percent for 2010.68 Nevertheless, this macroeconomic 
improvement must be understood as both limited and contingent. 
As this paper has shown, only the combination of international 
reserves accumulation and improved sustainability will lead to 
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broadened fiscal space, barring one-time heterodox policies as seen 
in Argentina. 
Above all other considerations, countries must be careful 
to learn the correct lesson from the 2008 crisis. It was not pub-
lic spending in general, but rather countercyclical public spend-
ing—and, indeed, the improvement of external conditions—that 
enabled growth rates to revive across the region. As Cárdenas and 
Levy-Yeyati (2011) discuss, it takes far less political maneuvering 
to tap into rainy day funds than it does to later renew countercycli-
cal saving as conditions improve. Everyone wants to use rainy day 
funds, but in good times these funds can be di#cult to store away. 
As much as the 2003–2007 boom was an important test of mac-
roeconomic restraint in the region, the upcoming years post-crisis 
will likely be even more important, as countries must look for ways 
to cool o" spending programs and begin to replenish, or at least 
maintain, their stocks of reserves. Countries may have earned the 
privilege of normality with respect to 2008; but will they fight to 
maintain it?
Latin America has the potential to provide for stability in the 
face of the ups and downs of the business and commodity cycles, 
but only if its countries can consolidate the fiscal restraint displayed 
in spurts between 2003 and 2007. As Rojas-Suarez (2010) argues, 
public savings rates in Latin America are still much too low, and 
governments in the region must find a way to sell renewed coun-
tercyclical restraint to their populations in anticipation of the next 
global downturn. Doing so will be di#cult. Programs implemented 
in the wake of crises are often broadly popular, and rolling these 
back is a tricky task for any politician seeking reelection, or indeed 
any party seeking public support.69 But even given this healthy 
dose of skepticism, it is di#cult to deny that Latin America has 
significant prospects for growth and stability in the foreseeable fu-
ture. !e 2008 crisis, for Latin America, was a far cry from the 
utter economic meltdowns witnessed at the turn of the century. It 
is clear that the region has progressed quite far in a relatively short 
period of time. As fiscal space, trade diversification, and targeted 
sovereign stabilization funds grow throughout the region, Latin 
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America may be on the path toward normality.
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